Preface
1 Introduction:On the Nature of the Literal.Metaphorical Distinction
2 Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics
2.1 The cognitive linguistics revolution
2.2 Experientialism and conceptual organization
2.3 Reasons to take experientialism seriously
2.4 Cognitive semantics and the literal.metaphorical distinction
2.5 Some problems for the philosophy of experientialism
2.6 Adjectival polysemy in the experientialist framework
3 The‘Hot’Polysemy
3.1 Why neurophysiology matters to semantics
3.2 The capsaicin receptor
3.3 Are hot peppers‘hot’for everyone?
3.4 The pain pathway
3.5 The standard assumption and the‘hot’polysemy
4 Across Sensory Modalities
4.1 Bright sounds and loud lights
4.2 Seeing sounds and tasting shapes
4.3 How different are synaesthetes and non.synaesthetes?
4.4 Cross.modal associations and synaesthetic metaphors
4.5 Synaesthetic adjectives and the standard assumption
4.6 The no.polysemy view of conceptual structure
4.7 How could have psychologically primitive concepts come abolJt?
5 Double.Function Terms
5.1 Apuzzle
5.2 Asch on double.function adjectives
5.3 Discussing Asch’S research:cross.linguistic studv
5.4 Conceptual atomism
5.5 Discussing Asch’S research:language acquisition study
6 Double.Function Terms Again
6.1 Adjectival polysemy in psycholinguistic research
6.2 Discussing Williams' results
6.3 The processing of alternative meanings by cerebral hemispheres:the beginnings
6.4 The processing of alternative meanings by cerebral hemispheres:later studies
7 Words and Concepts
8 Back to Cognitive Semantics
8.1 Sweetser's mind.as.body metaphor
8.2 Enter criticisms
9 Polysemy in Lexical Semantics
9.1 Semantics and conceptual structure:the beginnings
9.2 Polysemy and conceptual structure
9.3 The generative lexicon
9.4 The disquotational lexicon and the problem of polysen
10 The No.Polysemy View:What It Is and What It Is N
10.1 The one literal meaning assumption
10.2 The no.polysemy view
10.3 Words,meanings,concepts,and more
10.4 Metaphors forever
11 A Very Short Conclusion
Notes
References
Index