Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Abbreviations
中文摘要(Abstract)
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
1.2 The Concept of Corporate Governance
1.3 Ownership Structure,Agency Theory,and Firm Per-formance
CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL APROACH TO THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATE
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Market-based Model:the UK and US
2.2.1 The Internal Mechanisms
1 Delegation and Agency Problem
2 Shareholder Democyracy Model:A Traditional Compa-ny Theory
3 Board Reform
2.2.2. The External Mechanisms
1 The Nexus of Contracts Model:Neo-economic Theory
2 The Theory of the Product and Labor Market
3 The Theory of the Market for Corporate Control
2.3 The Bank-based Model:Germany and Japan
2.3.1 Introduction
2.3.2 The Potential Monitoring Mechanisms
2.3.3 Banks As Owners and Creditors
2.3.4 Two-Tier Board and Codetermination
2.4 Conclusion
CHAPTER 3 IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES:THE MARKET-BASED MODEL AND BANK-BASED MODEL
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Market-based Model and Its Implications
3.2.1 Classical Socialism and Its Corporate Governance
3.2.2 The First Stage:From1984TO1993
3.2.3 The Second Stage:Since1994
3.2.4 The Product Market
3.2.5 The Stock Market
3.3 The Bank-based Model and Its Applications
3.3.1 Introduction
3.3.2 Controlling Insider Conerol
3.3.3 The Main Bank System Approach and Its Applica-tions
3.4 Conclusion
CHAPTER4 THE STATE AS A LARGE SHAREHOLDER
CHAPTER 5 INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS'ACTIVISM
CHAPTER 6 THE POTENTIAL PAPTICIPANTS IN CHINA
CHAPTER 7 THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE IN CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES
CHAPTER 8 EXPROPRIATION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS BY CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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